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The Arbitrariness in “Arbitrariness”
(And Overbreadth and Gross
Disproportionality): Principle and
Democracy in Section 7 of the
Charter
Alana Klein*

I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of substantive protection in section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is expanding again. Recent
developments in the Supreme Court of Canada’s section 7 doctrine
support what one might call a substantive right to proportionate
government action, where that action affects the most fundamental of
rights: the rights to life, liberty and security of the person. In PHS
Community Services v. Canada, for example, the Supreme Court of
Canada confirmed that when determining whether a law that interferes
with the section 7 rights is arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly
disproportionate, courts must closely examine the relationship between a
law’s ends and its means.2 In doing so, they must look beyond whether a
*

Faculty of Law, McGill University.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. The move toward proportionality analysis may be
a partial or contested one. See Kent Roach, “Section 7 of the Charter and National Security: Rights
Protection and Proportionality versus Deference and Status” (2012) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 337
(identifying, in the context of national security, competing strands of s. 7 jurisprudence: one
requiring that limits on life, liberty and security of the person be justified as proportionate, and
another based on a priori deference to governments).
1
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piece of legislation could conceivably do what it purports to do, and
examine whether it does in fact. This is a far less deferential form of
arbitrariness review than previous jurisprudence had suggested.
Given the broad range of legislative and administrative decisions that
might have an impact on life, liberty and security of the person, the development could greatly expand the scope of questions that can be
subjected to section 7 review. Moreover, in the context of increasing
concerns that lawmaking (most notably the federal crime agenda) ignores
empirical evidence and is made with little democratic input beyond ordinary political processes, the focus on perverse impacts in section 7 could
play an important role in ferreting out government policies that affect the
most fundamental of rights and that are based on ideology or stereotype
over evidence.
Yet some worry that the empirical challenge of means-testing
government policies in a complex world would permit any judge who
simply disapproves of a law to find that it fails the means-ends
weighing.3 This objection recalls institutional capacity and legitimacy
concerns that have dogged section 7 since its early days. Part II of this
paper describes how courts have struggled, often unsuccessfully, to set
limits on expansiveness and subjectivity in section 7 interpretation. That
history suggests that the increasing prominence of proportionality
analysis in section 7 may be understood as a way to avoid the difficult
task of setting normative boundaries on the scope of the provision.
Part III examines the claim that arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality analysis invites capricious decision-making and
concludes that it may be impossible to avoid substantive normativity in
proportionality analysis. Part IV argues that this concern is far from new:
it has been central in our evaluation of proportionality analysis in section
1 of the Charter. Drawing on experience with proportionality analysis
under section 1 of the Charter, it argues that it may be possible for courts
to means-test government policy in a principled and transparent way, but
that this requires a link to a substantive conception of the purpose of the
Charter guarantee in question. So long as courts continue to perpetuate
the illusion that section 7 means-testing is value-neutral, allegations of
capriciousness will persist. Finally, the paper concludes in Part V with
some preliminary suggestions about how section 7’s purpose might be
understood so that means-testing might respond to policies that are
3

Peter Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)
195 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘The Brilliant Career’”].
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generated with limited empirical support and with limited democratic
legitimacy beyond ordinary political processes.

II. ELASTICITY AND LEGITIMACY IN SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER
The increasing reach and prominence of proportionality analysis
should be understood in light of section 7’s history. Jamie Cameron
describes section 7 as the Charter’s “problem child”4 precisely because
of its potential for elasticity.5 The entitlements listed in the first clause —
to life, but especially to liberty and security of the person — are far more
general than the remaining rights listed under the heading “legal rights”
in sections 8 to 14. The second clause — the principles of fundamental
justice — is, on the face of its text alone, devoid of substantive content.
In the context of ambiguous constitutional text protecting such
fundamental but general concepts as liberty and justice, legitimacy may
be lost in two ways. It may be lost in a liberal interpretation: is the Court
overreaching and protecting more than the text of the provision provides?
But it may also be lost in narrow interpretation: is the Court shirking its
responsibilities to uphold constitutional standards? Because of this
tension, section 7’s history can be told as a struggle to preserve the
Court’s institutional legitimacy in the face of its duty to give meaning to
this ambiguous text.6
The development of jurisprudence on the definition of liberty
illustrates the different ways in which judges have struggled to give
meaning to section 7 entitlements without compromising the Court’s
institutional role, and their ultimate difficulty resisting the expansive
force of the concept. Perhaps most famously, Wilson J. in her concurring
reasons in R. v. Morgentaler, defined liberty broadly to “guarantee to
every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions
intimately affecting their private lives”,7 including the right to terminate

4

Jamie Cameron, “From MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the Future
of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105, at 105 [hereinafter “Cameron”].
5
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 498 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”].
6
A thorough history of this struggle is too complex for this short paper, but see Cameron,
supra, note 4 for a careful analysis of the various competing strands of Supreme Court of Canada
jurisprudence interpreting both s. 7’s entitlements and its internal limitations clauses, and the ways in
which concerns over preserving institutional legitimacy drove and troubled the jurisprudence.
7
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 48, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 462 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Morgentaler”].
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a pregnancy. Similarly, in R. v. Jones, she held that the liberty interest
included a parent’s right “to raise children in accordance with his
conscientious beliefs”.8 Early lines of jurisprudence suggested that
“human dignity is precisely what underlies the liberty interest in s. 7”,9
and, on that basis, held that section 7 could extend, for example, to rights
to choose one’s occupation.10
These cases, positing a broad, arguably amorphous substantive right
to liberty, competed for prominence in a fractured jurisprudence with
Lamer J.’s (later Lamer C.J.C.’s) steadfast efforts to confine liberty to
encounters with the administration of justice that put physical freedom at
risk.11 His interpretation was based in part on the text and his view of the
purpose of section 7. For example, he sought to distinguish liberty in
section 7 from the freedoms protected in section 2 of the Charter, and
suggested that the concepts of life, liberty and security of the person are
connected through the concept of a person’s corporeal or physical
being.12 But Lamer C.J.C.’s approach to section 7 was also clearly
motivated by concerns over the limits of the courts’ institutional role: he
stated that a broader interpretation of liberty “would have the effect of
conferring prima facie constitutional protection on all eccentricities
expressed by members of our society under the rubric of ‘liberty’” and
would “inevitably lead to a situation where we would have government
by judges”.13 In Lamer C.J.C.’s view, review could legitimately be
undertaken so long as it was confined to matters within the justice
system, an area in which judges are expert.
Despite Lamer J.’s resistance, the Court ultimately adopted the
broader conception of liberty whose roots lay in Morgentaler and Jones.
In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), the Court
pronounced unequivocally that the liberty interest is no longer limited to

8

“Jones”].

R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 319 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

9
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1092, 160
D.L.R. (4th) 303, at para. 88 (B.C.C.A.).
10
Mia v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1985] B.C.J. No. 2920, 17
D.L.R. (4th) 385, at 414-15 (B.C.S.C.);Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission),
[1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 18 (B.C.S.C.) .
11
See, e.g., Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990]
S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]; B. (R.) v.
Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 348
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Children’s Aid Society”].
12
Children’s Aid Society, id. at 347-48.
13
Id., at 347.
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freedom from physical restraint; rather, “‘liberty’ is engaged where state
compulsions or prohibitions affect important and fundamental life
choices. ... In our society, individuals are entitled to make decisions of
fundamental importance free from state interference.”14 The struggle for
boundaries continued: though it recognized the broader liberty right in
principle, the Court limited liberty of the person to “a narrow sphere of
inherently personal decision-making” and held that the delay in processing a human rights complaint in Blencoe did not, on the facts, prevent the
applicant from making any fundamental personal choices.15 In fact, a
majority of the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a case in which fundamental personal choices so affect the liberty interest as to run afoul of
section 7,16 though lower courts have recognized such instances of the
liberty interest.17 Further, despite this broader interpretation of the liberty
interest, the Court has purported to draw the line at the suggestion that
section 7 protects “purely economic interests”.18 As a result, some early
section 7 cases, such as those suggesting that the right to liberty includes
“the right to choose one’s occupation and where to pursue it”19 are now
considered wrongly decided.20 Meanwhile, in other cases, rights that might
be characterized as economic have been recognized among section 7’s
substantive entitlements.21
14
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 307, at para. 49 (S.C.C.).
15
Id., at para. 54.
16
It has, however, recognized that sufficiently severe psychological distress might engage
security of the person. See New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),
[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.).
17
R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 92 (Ont. C.A.) (holding
that a prohibition on medical marijuana engaged the liberty interest by denying the applicant his
choice of medication to alleviate the effects of an illness with life-threatening consequences);
Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 313 D.L.R (4th) 29, at para. 109 (B.C.C.A.)
(holding that a prohibition on the erection of temporary shelters in public parks, in the context of
insufficient homeless shelters in the area, constituted “a significant interference with [the
applicants’] dignity and independence”).
18
See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713,
at 786 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards Books”]; Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2002]
S.C.J. No. 69, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 46 (S.C.C.) (holding that the ability to operate a video
lottery terminal is not a “fundamental life choice” because it is a purely economic interest).
19
Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 18 (B.C.C.A.).
20
Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2012), at 92 [hereinafter “Stewart”].
21
See, e.g., Cameron, supra, note 4, at note 198 (characterizing the rights claimed in
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Godbout”] and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R 791
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The broadened, more elastic scope in section 7’s entitlements could
be expected to put additional pressure on its second clause to respond to
concerns about judicial overreaching. Indeed, the need to cabin the potential breadth of the principles of fundamental justice was recognized
from the moment section 7 was given substantive rather than merely procedural content. In one of Charter jurisprudence’s most oft-cited
passages, the majority in the Motor Vehicle Reference explained that “the
principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of
our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but
in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the legal system.”22
These principles of fundamental justice were thus limited to principles —
however substantive and normative — that have been “recognized as
essential elements of a system for the administration of justice which is
founded upon a belief in ‘the dignity and worth of the human person’ ...
and on ‘the rule of law’”.23
In the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court recognized its
first principle of fundamental justice: that criminal liability requires
proof of fault.24 And in the years following, many substantive principles
of fundamental justice were recognized, mostly linked to the institutions
of criminal justice. These have included the pre-trial right to silence,25 a
prohibition on convicting someone for murder if they did not intend to
cause death,26 and a right to make a full answer and defence, in turn implying a disclosure obligation on the Crown.27
Even from the early days, however, there were principles of fundamental justice with less precisely substantive content than those related to
penal responsibility listed in the previous paragraph. In Jones, La Forest J.,
writing for the plurality of the Court, recognized that a law limiting life,
liberty and security of the person would violate the principles of fundamental justice if it were “manifestly unfair”.28 This language was
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”] as “economic or quasi-economic in nature”. In Godbout, the Court
invalidated a municipal resolution requiring municipal employees to live within its territorial limits,
with two judges relying on the liberty interest in s. 7 of the Charter. In Chaoulli, access to private
health insurance was protected under the guarantee of security of the person.
22
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5, at 503.
23
Id.
24
Id., at 514.
25
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.).
26
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
27
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
28
Jones, supra, note 8, at para. 41.
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famously picked up in Morgentaler to invalidate a criminal law limiting
women’s access to abortion. The regime purported to give access to
therapeutic abortions, but contained so many barriers to its own operation that access was practically unavailable:29 effectively, the law did not
further its own objectives.30 Justice McLachlin, in her dissenting opinion
in Rodriguez, equated manifest unfairness with arbitrariness and found
the prohibition on assisted suicide to be arbitrary.31 The prohibition on
arbitrariness only rose to prominence 10 years later, however, in the plurality and majority decisions in Chaoulli and R. v. Malmo-Levine32
respectively. Two other principles targeting the means-ends relationship
of government action developed alongside the rule against arbitrariness:
R. v. Heywood recognized that laws must not be overbroad;33 and
Malmo-Levine held that a law would violate the principles of fundamental justice if it were “grossly disproportionate in its effects on accused
persons, when considered in light of [its] objective[s]”.34
The elevation of means-ends relationship of government action to a
principle of fundamental justice has been criticized for “lack[ing] a content and a methodology”.35 Indeed, McLachlin J.’s early reliance on
arbitrariness in her dissenting opinion in Rodriguez prompted the majority, which found no violation of section 7’s second clause, to reiterate
that the principles of fundamental justice must be “legal principles”;
there must be sufficient societal consensus that the alleged principle is
“vital or fundamental to our societal notions of justice”; and they must be

29

Morgentaler, supra, note 7, at 72, per Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.; see similarly
Morgentaler, at 110, per Beetz J. and Estey J. (stating that the scheme’s requirements “are
manifestly unfair because they have no connection whatsoever with Parliament’s objectives in
establishing the administrative structure”).
30
Id., at 110, per Beetz J. and Estey J.
31
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519, at para. 206 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”] (holding that the purpose of the prohibition on
assisted suicide — the protection of autonomy — was not furthered by the law in the case of Sue
Rodriguez and that therefore “the objective that motivates the legislative scheme that Parliament has
enacted to treat suicide is not reflected in its treatment of assisted suicide”).
32
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Malmo-Levine”].
33
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Heywood”].
34
Supra, note 32, at para. 169.
35
Cameron, supra, note 4, at 159 (observing that the arbitrariness standard in Rodriguez,
“in function and effect, propose[s] a ‘fairness standard’ which allows the court to invalidate laws
simply because they are considered unfair”).
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capable of being “identified with precision and applied to situations in a
manner that yields predictable results”.36
These concerns sharpen as proportionality analysis has become
increasingly prominent37 and powerful38 in recent years. As the next
section demonstrates, proportionality analysis — particularly in the more
searching form that has emerged since PHS — has created more space
for the often hidden influence of subjective values. This is so despite the
fact that proportionality analysis purports to be a value-neutral or
content-neutral task that does not pass on the substantive ends of
government policy but simply on whether the government is pursuing its
own ends faithfully and with sufficient precision.

III. SUBJECTIVITY IN “ARBITRARINESS, OVERBREADTH AND
GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY”
The claim that arbitrariness, overbreadth and disproportionality
analysis reflects little more than judges’ policy preferences is compelling.
Capricious or unprincipled decision-making may come from the way the
court characterizes the purpose of allegedly infringing action, as well as
how the court appreciates facts in its analysis of arbitrariness, overbreadth and disproportionality.
1. Purposes
Any consideration of the relationship between a government action’s
means and its ends requires that the goals — or in the language of
Oakes,39 the purpose — of that action be identified. Yet, there is no clear
methodology for identifying the purpose of laws or policies against
which its means are to be tested. How a law or policy’s purpose is construed and deployed may determine the results of means-testing analysis
in a number of ways.

36

Rodriguez, supra, note 31, at 590-91.
See, e.g., PHS, supra, note 2; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2012] O.J.
No. 1296, 109 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 68 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and reserved June 13, 2013, [2012]
S.C.C.A. No. 159 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012]
B.C.J. No. 1196, 287 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227, 2013 BCCA 435
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter”].
38
See supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
39
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
37
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In PHS, for example, the Supreme Court measured the federal refusal to grant a statutory exemption from drug laws against the purpose
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act40 as a whole: the protection
of health and public safety. This characterization of the purpose of the
legislation made it easier for the Court to find the denial of the constitutional exemption arbitrary and grossly disproportionate: creating criminal
law obstacles for Insite did nothing to promote health and safety (on the
contrary), even as it presented a uniform stance on the possession of narcotics. Had the purpose of the Act been characterized as discouraging, or
even curbing, the use of illegal drugs, then it would have been more difficult for the claimants to position Insite as furthering rather than
undermining the goals of the legislation.
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s finding that Canada’s anti-prostitution laws were overbroad and
grossly disproportionate to their purpose was driven largely by the ways in
which the court characterized the purpose of those laws. The court
considered multiple possible purposes behind the criminal prohibitions on
operating bawdyhouses, living off the avails of prostitution and
communicating for the purposes of prostitution, and ultimately defined
each rather narrowly. The Attorney General of Ontario urged the broadest
possible characterizations. It suggested, for example, that the bawdyhouse
provisions were designed to promote values of dignity and equality by
criminalizing a practice that reinforces anti-egalitarian attitudes.41 (It is
worth noting that such a characterization would permit a reviewing court
to determine that a law can serve its purpose simply by “sending a
message”, which sits uneasily with the requirement in PHS that laws
affecting the section 7 interest must serve their purpose in fact, on the
evidence, and not merely in theory.) The Attorney General of Canada
argued that the purpose of the bawdyhouse provisions was to discourage
and deter prostitution in order to prevent harm to those who engage in
prostitution outside of the public view. The court, based on historical
analysis, ultimately concluded that the law’s purpose was to combat
neighbourhood disruption and disorder. With the purpose so narrowly
construed, the court could more easily find the bawdyhouse provisions
overbroad and grossly disproportionate. The similarly narrowly defined
purpose of the living-off-the-avails provisions — the prevention of

40
41

S.C. 1996, c. 19.
Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 182.
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exploitation — allowed the court to conclude that it too, was overbroad in
its scope and grossly disproportionate in its effects.
The judges at the Court of Appeal were ultimately divided by their
disagreement over how the communication provision’s purpose ought to
be construed.42 The majority preferred a broader interpretation of the
objective of the communication provision: addressing the social
nuisances flowing directly from prostitution (street congestion and noise,
oral harassment of non-participants and general detrimental effects on
passers-by, especially children), as well as other behaviours which in its
view were “associated” with prostitution (such as drug possession, drug
trafficking, public intoxication and organized crime).43 The expanded
conception of the purpose of the provision permitted the majority to
place greater weight on the extent to which the provision served its goals
in its analysis of gross disproportionality. The dissent, by contrast, found
that the impact of the communication provision on the lives and safety of
sex workers was grossly disproportionate in part because it weighed the
impacts of the legislation against a narrower range of government
objectives (and arguably less serious ones): “street congestion and noise,
oral harassment of non-participants and general detrimental effects on
passers-by or bystanders, especially children”.44
In R. v. Khawaja, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a criminal
prohibition on participation in terrorist activity by construing the purpose
of the legislation narrowly, and then interpreting the prohibition narrowly
in accordance with that purpose.45 In doing so, it arguably avoided close
scrutiny of the prohibition’s likely effects.
Opponents of the prohibition on participation in terrorist activity were
concerned that it had the potential to encompass people who, while not
terrorists themselves, had some involvement — financial or political —
with terrorists, even if, for example, the accused’s contribution never
actually enhanced the group’s activity to carry out terrorist activity, or the
accused did not know the nature of the activity being considered.46
42

All the members of the court rejected the broadest interpretation of the purpose of
legislation urged by the Attorney General of Ontario — to combat the “normalizing” effect
exposure to prostitution can have on children (id., at para. 286).
43
Id., at para. 307.
44
Id., at para. 347.
45
R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2102] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”].
46
The Canadian Bar Association, for example, feared that the law could apply to lawyers
who represented known terrorists (Canadian Bar Association, Submission on Bill C-36 – Antiterrorism Act (October 2001), online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org/pdf/
submission.pdf>, at 26); Kent Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and The Criminal Law” in
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The law’s purpose, reasoned the Court, was to prosecute and prevent
terrorism, not to punish individuals for “innocent, socially useful or casual
acts, which, absent any intent, indirectly contribute to a terrorist
activity”.47 Having so circumscribed the purpose, the Court then went on
to interpret the participation prohibition narrowly in conformity with that
purpose — an offender must have the “higher subjective purpose” of
helping a terrorist to carry out terrorism — and ultimately upheld it as
constitutional.48 By elevating the mental element of the offence, the Court
in some respects appears to answer its opponents’ concerns. However, it
has been criticized for failing to accurately reflect government’s intention,
and also for its failure to clarify what such a “higher subjective purpose”
might be.49
PHS, Bedford and Khawaja demonstrate that courts may strike
down, uphold, or craft the meaning of legislation through the way in
which they cast legislative purpose against which to assess arbitrariness,
overbreadth, and gross disproportionality. Even as it denies that courts
pass on the wisdom of those legislative goals, the process leaves much
scope for subjectivity.
2. Arbitrariness, Overbreadth and Gross Disproportionality
We are in the early days of the development of the principles of fundamental justice that relate to the means-ends fit, or proportionality, of
government action. Although courts have acknowledged challenges in
distinguishing among the doctrines for overbreadth, arbitrariness and
gross disproportionality, these are beginning to emerge as a set of three
distinct principles.50 Each may be criticized for failing to adequately
cabin judicial caprices.
(a) Arbitrariness
Chaoulli ushered in a more searching test for arbitrariness that was
ultimately endorsed by the full court in PHS, one that asks not only
Patrick Macklem, Ronald J. Daniels & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 151, at 161.
47
Khawaja, supra, note 45, at para. 44.
48
Id., at para. 45.
49
Peter Sankoff, “Khawaja: Mixed Messages on the Meaning of Intention, Purpose and
Desire” (2013), available on SSRN, at 8 [hereinafter “Sankoff”].
50
See Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 151.
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whether a law could reasonably serve its purpose,51 but whether it does
on the facts. The judicial standard for arbitrariness is not settled:52 In
Chaoulli itself, three judges would find state action affecting life, liberty
or security of the person if it is not “necessary”53 to further the state objective. Three would have posited a stricter test: ask instead whether the
state action “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest
that lies behind the legislation”.54 The latter test is more deferential,
though the reasons for preferring one level of deference over another is
not clearly articulated in the case. Both definitions of arbitrariness, however, rely closely on facts. And, indeed, it was the Court’s appreciation of
the facts in Chaoulli about the relationship between the ban on parallel
private health insurance and the necessary conditions for protecting the
public health care system that most divided the Court and that has attracted the most scholarly criticism.55
(b) Overbreadth
The doctrine of overbreadth raises similar concerns about judges’
abilities to appropriately weigh facts in the proportionality assessment. In
R. v. Heywood, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
provision of the Criminal Code56 that prohibited anyone who had been
convicted of sexual assault from “loitering in or near a schoolyard, playground, public park, or bathing area”. Exemplifying concerns discussed
above, the majority and dissent disagreed about the purpose of the legislation: was it designed to protect children only, or also adults? They
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See, e.g., Malmo-Levine, supra, note 32.
PHS, supra, note 2, at para. 132.
Chaoulli, supra, note 21, at paras. 131-132.
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Id., at para. 232. This latter test was adopted by the courts in Bedford, supra, note 37, at
paras. 145-147 and Carter, supra, note 37, at para. 1332 (S.C.).
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See Martha Jackman, “The Last Line of Defence for [Which?] Citizens: Accountability,
Equality and the Right to Health in Chaoulli” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 349, at 357; Hamish
Stewart, “Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases” in Colleen Flood, Kent
Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005) [hereinafter “Access to Care”] 207, at 211; Charles G. Wright, “Different
Interpretations of ‘Evidence’ and Implications for the Canadian Healthcare System” in Access to
Care, id., 220, at 223 (all criticized the Supreme Court’s failure to attend to expert evidence
justifying the insurance ban, Wright calling it “utterly inexplicable”); Sujit Choudhry, “So What is
the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s
Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501, at 534 [hereinafter “Choudhry”] (“The Court’s disregard for
this evidence is nothing short of astonishing”).
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disagreed about the interpretation of the legislation — notably around
whether loitering required any malevolent intent beyond simply hanging
around without any particular purpose. Most importantly for the present
purposes, they disagreed about key factual questions, such as whether
those who sexually assault adults are any more likely to pose a threat to
children,57 and the magnitude of risks of re-offence for sexual offences.
Most recently, in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme
Court of British Columbia relied on the newly developed doctrine of
overbreadth to read down the offence of assisting suicide, effectively revisiting the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1993 decision to uphold the
same legislation in Rodriguez. The courts in both cases understood the
prohibition’s purpose in the same way: to protect the vulnerable who
might be induced in moments of weakness to commit suicide.58 What
permitted revisiting Rodriguez, in the British Columbia Supreme Court’s
estimation, was how the newly developed and searching doctrines of
overbreadth and gross disproportionality interacted with new “legislative
and social facts” (emphasis added) that were not available at the time
Rodriguez was decided. These included experience in jurisdictions with
legalized physician-assisted death, changes in palliative care practices
including reliance on the more painful terminal sedation in order to end
life without running afoul of the criminal law, changes in Canadian public opinion, parliamentary and other reports since Rodriguez, and
developments in medical ethics that found no meaningful ethical difference between physician-assisted suicide and end-of-life practices like
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or administering
palliative sedation that might hasten death.59 The Court ultimately
granted a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted suicide on the
factual bases that the risks inherent in permitting physician-assisted death
could be mitigated through a system of judicial safeguards. It concluded
that absolute prohibition was overbroad because it was neither necessary

57
Heywood, supra, note 33, at 809, Gonthier J. In the dissent’s view: “Contrary to
conventional wisdom, Dr Abel discovered that there is extensive cross-offending so that a given
offender is likely to be involved in a variety of different activities throughout a lifetime.”
58
Carter, supra, note 37. One of Smith J.’s reasons for departing from Rodriguez was that
overbreadth and gross disproportionality have only more recently emerged and been articulated as
distinct principles of fundamental justice. The Ontario Court of Appeal relied on similar reasoning to
reconsider the prostitution offences in Bedford (supra, note 37) despite the Supreme Court of
Canada’s prior consideration of the provisions in the Prostitution Reference (supra, note 11).
59
Carter, supra, note 37, at paras. 942, 1336 (S.C.).
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to prevent inducement of suicide by vulnerable persons, nor was it the
least restrictive means by which to do so.60
(c) Gross Disproportionality
Gross disproportionality analysis has explicitly depended not only on
how the facts are appreciated, but also on normative values and
assumptions about the harms and benefits of government action. In
Bedford, disagreement between the majority and dissenting justices about
the disproportionate effect of the communication provisions on the lives
and safety of street-based sex workers can be traced in part to different
evaluations of the facts. The majority thought there was less evidence
about the safety benefits of screening customers than there was about the
benefits of moving indoors and hiring bodyguards; the dissenting judges,
on the other hand, felt that the safety benefits of screening, as well as
working in public as opposed to on isolated streets, were well
established.61 The majority found that street-based sex workers could
mitigate the harms that came from the inability to verbally screen
prospective customers, for example by relying on their intuition, checking
customers’ appearance, backseats of cars, or having friends nearby to take
down licence plates.62 The dissent considered that these alternatives were
not as effective at mitigating the dangers of sex work as unrushed verbal
negotiation.63
But the different appreciation of the facts in Bedford was also driven
by values about the role of government in driving and responding to systemic inequality. The majority took a formal approach, holding that
poverty, addiction, gender and race are the primary sources of streetbased sex workers’ marginalization and that the communication provision itself only partially contributed to the harm they faced on the streets.
Weighing the harm caused by the communication provision only, and
subtracting the impact of systemic factors, the majority concluded that
the legislation’s harm was not grossly disproportionate to its benefits in
combating social nuisance. The dissent points out that this “turn[s] the
question of pre-existing disadvantage on its head”.64 Rather than diluting
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the adverse effect of the communication provision, in the dissent’s view
pre-existing marginalization exacerbates it. The question of whether and
how systemic vulnerability ought to be considered in a purposive interpretation of section 7 will be discussed further below.

IV. DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: RULES AND PRINCIPLES FOR
GUIDING DEFERENCE UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER
The yearning for principle in managing deference under section 7 of
the Charter should feel deeply familiar. Struggle over deference to
Parliament has been a leitmotif in section 7’s own history, as suggested
in Part II of this paper. Moreover, although the more searching section 7
standard is relatively recent, rights-affecting government policy has been
means-tested for nearly 30 years under section 1 of the Charter, via the
Oakes65 test on proportionality. Over time, the test has been criticized for
the ways in which courts have retreated from its robust application to
allow greater deference to government, and, through this process, for its
growing indeterminacy.66 This section describes the ways in which
section 1 analysis has grown increasingly deferential — most notably by
taking the factual assessment about policy impact to the forefront of the
judicial task — such that it presents similar challenges of judicial
capacity and legitimacy as in the proportionality analysis in section 7.
Next, it canvasses some of the devices that the Supreme Court has used
to bring principle to that assessment and finds that these must be tethered
to the purpose of section 1 to have meaning in context.
Oakes, on its face, presents a more exacting form of proportionality
test than the one emerging through section 7. First, under section 1, government bears the burden of demonstrating proportionality; section 7, as
a substantive right, places the burden on the rights claimant to prove the
absence of a sufficient connection between government law or policy
and its impact. Oakes requires government to demonstrate a pressing and
substantial objective; courts applying the section 7 proportionality analysis identify, but do not evaluate, government objectives. At this point, it
may be too early to distinguish the section 7 standard on arbitrariness
from the rational connection test in Oakes, as well as Oakes’ minimal

65

Supra, note 39.
Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
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impairment from the rule against overbreadth in section 7. The final
Oakes branch requiring proportionality, however, is clearly more stringent than section 7’s prohibition on gross disproportionality.
But over the years, the courts seem to have softened the requirements
of Oakes,67 often in ways that have increased the burden on courts to
pronounce upon more subjective questions such as the impact of rights
infringements on individuals and the importance and effectiveness of
government policy.68 The need for a “pressing and substantial objective”
can now be satisfied by objectives that are merely “valid” and “sufficiently important”.69 The demand for careful legislative design at the
rational connection stage has been replaced with the requirement that the
means simply further, in some way, the legislative objective.70 The subjective task of courts has been broadened through two developments in
the “minimal impairment” test. First, “minimally impairing” has been
downgraded to “impairing as little as is reasonably possible”. Courts
must perform the more subjective task of determining whether there is
some “reasonable alternative scheme” instead of whether the measure
was the least intrusive available.71 More recently, in Alberta v. Hutterian
Brethren of Wilson Colony, the Supreme Court qualified that the minimal
impairment test cannot be satisfied by pointing to “less drastic means
which do not actually achieve the government’s objective”.72 Instead, one
must ask whether there is an alternative, less drastic means that will
achieve the government’s objectives just as fully.73 This question itself
draws courts closer into difficult factual questions about the extent to
which means fulfil their purpose in fact. Moreover, it pushes the analysis
toward the final Oakes stage of balancing proportionality between the
infringement and the objective, which “allows for a broader assessment
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See Choudhry, supra, note 55, at 507.
See Lorraine Weinrib, “Limitations on Rights in a Constitutional Democracy” (1996) 6
Caribbean L. Rev. 428, lamenting the softening of Oakes.
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R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 36 (S.C.C.); Prostitution
Reference, supra, note 11, at 1190.
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Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.).
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Edward Books, supra, note 18, at 772.
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Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567, at para. 54 (S.C.C.).
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of whether the benefits of the impugned law are worth the cost of the
rights limitation”.74
The overall result is that as the scope for weighing of the deleterious
and salutary effects of legislation expands, as analysis is pushed further
into the realm of factual contest, it may become easier for judges to appreciate those facts in conformity with their own normative preferences
and frameworks.75 Petter and Monahan’s words two years into the loosening of the Oakes test remain apt: “The court still has the stringent
Oakes test sitting on the shelf waiting to be dusted off for use at an appropriate moment ... any time that the Court wants to strike down a law,”
but “on the other hand, when they are dealing with a law with which they
are relatively unsympathetic, the Court is able to step aside and basically
allow the legislature to do what it wants”.76
The Supreme Court, for a number of years, worked to develop devices for managing subjectivity under the loosening Oakes test by listing
considerations to guide deference at the minimal impairment stage
(which has, until recently, been understood to be the point of greatest
friction in the section 1 analysis). These categories and classifications all
relate in different ways to courts’ institutional capacity and legitimacy in
interfering with government choices in the name of Charter protection.
The Court would construe minimal impairment more strictly, for example, where the Court enjoyed some institutional advantage or
expertise, as the Court felt it did in criminal justice contexts.77 (This
same reasoning may explain the Court’s early efforts, based on the Motor
Vehicle Reference, to constrain the principles of fundamental justice to
legal, most often criminal, institutions.) By contrast, where the Court is
mediating concerns between competing claims of different groups, it
might not be able to achieve the same degree of certainty, and might need
to defer, as it did in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General).78
Where the interests that government is protecting are those of vulnerable
groups, such as children,79 employees80 or low-skilled, non-unionized
74
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workers,81 greater deference has been urged, presumably on the basis that
the government might, too, be protecting Charter-related interests
through legislation. In addition, the Court might view competing resource claims as a reason to defer. In McKinney v. University of Guelph,
for example, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a
university’s mandatory retirement policy on the basis that universities
needed financial flexibility, for example to recruit new faculty members.82 Finally, the Court might rank constitutionally protected interests,
and require a higher standard of proof for the more important ones.83 This
is most evident in the free speech jurisprudence, where “core” free speech
interests like political speech warrant more scrutiny than “peripheral”
speech like commercial expression or sexually explicit expression.84
The proportionality requirement in section 7, as it has grown more
searching, has likewise come to focus on contestable factual assessments.
In managing the empirical task, it might be tempting to reach for a similar set of classifications to determine deference under section 7. And
indeed, the courts’ categories for section 1 deference may be able to explain some of the section 7 arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality decisions so far. A lower deference standard in criminal law cases could justify or explain the Court’s assertiveness in
construing both the purpose and the interpretation of the legislation in
Khawaja narrowly via concepts of intent.85 Deference to legislative protections of the vulnerable might justify the Supreme Court favouring
Insite’s continued operation over the uniform application of the federal
drug law. The majority in Bedford may have applied its particular brand
of vulnerability analysis to both sides of the balancing exercise, which
might explain why it deferred to the government’s interest in protecting
children from seeing prostitution-related communication to justify the
risks to the lives and safety of sex workers posed by the communication
prohibition.

81
82

Edward Books, supra, note 18.
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at 286

(S.C.C.).
83

This evokes the U.S. practice of applying strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, but to test
only the rational basis of legislation for rights that are not classified as fundamental.
84
The Supreme Court rejected an argument from interveners representing sexual minorities
that sexually explicit expression is a form of political expression in Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) and
in R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.).
85
Even if it may have gotten them wrong (Sankoff, supra, note 49).

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

PRINCIPLE AND DEMOCRACY IN SECTION 7

395

Yet in section 1 doctrine, these classifications failed to stand up as
determinants of deference for a number of reasons.86 First, courts failed
to consistently follow these schemas. In the context of freedom of
expression, for example, the Court has in practice shown almost as much
deference on political speech, which is considered “core” speech, as it
has on other issues.87 In addition, the distinctions often lacked internal
cogency. For example, courts could not justify lower deference on
criminal law cases on the basis that they were balancing state versus
individual interests alone, given the stake that victims, and society more
broadly, have in the scope and enforcement of criminal law. For this
reason, in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) in
1998, the majority of the Court rejected the criminal/non-criminal binary
and stated that “nothing ... suggests that there is one category of cases in
which a lower standard of s. 1 is applied and another in which a higher
standard is applied”.88 The parallel with courts’ difficulty confining
section 7’s reach to institutions of criminal justice is evident.
Although it may not be feasible to rely on binary categories to create
a mechanism for determining deference, the rationales underlying those
categories may continue to inform capacity and legitimacy in judicial
means-testing in both section 1 and section 7.89 It is important to recognize, however, that these common institutional capacity and legitimacy
factors ought to weigh differently in a purposive, contextually-grounded
application of the different sections.
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Section 1 has been understood as a device for placing limits on
rights, based on the recognition that courts lack the democratic authority
provided by electoral accountability, and that they lack expertise and resources to determine whether a particular law will increase the general
welfare.90 In other words, section 1 is explicitly concerned with tempering judicial overreach in light of the legislature’s presumed democratic
legitimacy; its mandate is to protect the general welfare; and its superior
resources for collection, analysis and integration of empirical data for
policy formulation. These factors operate differently in different contexts. Thus, in the wake of Chaoulli (in which the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down a measure designed to protect the public health care
system in favour of an individual right to purchase private health insurance), Sujit Choudhry defended the less exacting Oakes standard. In his
view, a more flexible Oakes standard, requiring not proof, but “reasoned
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relation to the
seriousness of the infringement”,91 recognizes that governments need to
be able to act in the public interest under conditions of uncertainty. Oakes
should be understood as a way of allocating the risk of uncertainty,92
bearing in mind such factors as relative institutional expertise, the balancing of interests, particularly those of the vulnerable, and the
seriousness of the rights interests at stake.
Section 7, on the other hand, is a substantive, individual right. If the
guarantees against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality
are to be understood as substantive principles of fundamental justice,
their application must be guided by a conception of section 7’s substantive purpose. Untethered from such a purpose, it is difficult to know
which factors for deference ought to be favoured and why, and deference
on factual determinations will appear to be capriciously allocated. The
final section of this paper draws lessons from section 7’s history and
makes some preliminary suggestions about how substantive normativity
might guide judicial deference in the context of a section 7 right to proportionate lawmaking.
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V. BEYOND LIMITATIONS: A RIGHT TO PROPORTIONATE
LAWMAKING?
The rising prominence of proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice can be understood as a retreat to an appearance of valueneutrality following the difficulty setting substantive boundaries on entitlements such as liberty and limiting the principles of fundamental justice
to those linked with institutions of justice.93 And yet, although proportionality analysis appears to assess only how closely government action
tracks its goals, substantive values may be inescapable as courts identify
those goals and scrutinize proportionality with close attention to the policy’s real-world impacts, in all its complexity.94 If proportionality is to
retain legitimacy among the principles of fundamental justice, courts
may need to be more explicit about the values that guide its application.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully flesh out what those values
might be or to place them within existing justifications for rights-based
review.95 I do, however, suggest that the focus on proportionality reflects
an underlying concern in section 7 with overweening or abusive majoritarianism. So understood, purposive proportionality analysis may permit
courts to take into account the transparency and inclusiveness of lawmaking beyond ordinary political processes among the factors guiding
deference.
The Supreme Court has not decisively set out the purpose of section 7
the way it has for other rights.96 It has, however suggested methodologies
for identifying the principles of fundamental justice, which certainly
inform that purpose. The Motor Vehicle Reference stated that the principles
of fundamental justice are exemplified by the guarantees in sections 8-14,
and might also be expressed in common law rules.97 But as Hamish
Stewart has observed, the “common thread among these principles was not
their historical association with a particular legal system or international
93

See Part II, supra.
See Part III, supra.
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order but their connection with a normative idea about the function of
law”.98 The Motor Vehicle Reference suggested that the principles of
fundamental justice are founded upon the “dignity and worth of the
human person” and the “rule of law”.99
The ways in which the principles against arbitrariness and gross disproportionality are driven by the rule of law or the dignity and worth of a
human being have not been made explicit.100 In fact, ironically, the only
time the Court has invoked the rule of law in relation to gross disproportionality has been to uphold the criminal prohibition on non-medical use
of marijuana on the basis that it would undermine the rule of law for the
Court to count the fact that people do not comply with the law against it
in the analysis of gross disproportionality.101
On the other hand, some keys to the link between the protection from
arbitrary action on the one hand and rule of law and human dignity on
the other may be found in the jurisprudence. In Heywood, for example,
Cory J. stated that overbroad laws violate the principles of fundamental
justice because they limit rights for no reason.102 The same can of course
be said of arbitrary laws. Grossly disproportionate laws limit rights for
insufficient reason. The proportionality norms can thus be understood to
vindicate the dignity of human beings and arguably rule of law by protecting against overweening majoritarianism — majoritarianism that
takes insufficient account of the needs of those whose interests may be
excluded from or harmed by law and policy.
If the norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality are designed to protect against overweening majoritarianism, it
follows that, in addition to the capacity- and legitimacy-affecting factors
considered explicitly or implicitly within the Oakes framework, courts
adjudicating section 7 claims may be less inclined to shift the risk of uncertainty onto government where its laws and policies are made with
demonstrated attention and input from those most affected, including
those marginalized from legislative processes.103 Hogg states the same
98
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proposition in the inverse in response to his own concerns about judicial
overreaching in section 7 adjudication: “If persons harmed by the dysfunctional law have little popular appeal or political power, then
legislators may be uninterested in their problems and disinclined to take
any action especially if they believe that a remedial law is likely to be
unpopular. In that situation, there is a case for judicial review of the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person of the unpopular
minority.”104 In the context of challenges to the federal crime agenda, for
example, the legitimacy of judicial intervention would not come from
courts’ relative expertise in the appropriateness of, say, mandatory minimum sentences (which may be a question of values over which the court
has no greater institutional legitimacy), but from the facility with which
the majoritarian legislatures might sacrifice the rights of the abstract accused, considering in particular the social and political marginalization of
those who pass through the criminal justice system.
There are methodological, doctrinal, and conceptual challenges to
factoring marginalization from political processes into deference granted
in proportionality analysis. How are politically powerless minorities to
be identified? And when will efforts to include and consider such minorities answer a charge of overweening majoritarianism? Such questions
have troubled international human rights scholars interpreting similar
requirements to include the participation of marginalized groups in health
policy, for example.105
Furthermore, courts have historically been reluctant to inquire into
the “democratic quality” of laws passed through constitutionally mandated processes. In Wells v. Newfoundland, for example, the Court
affirmed that legislative decision-making was not subject to any administrative law duty of fairness beyond the constitutional requirements for
valid law-making.106 Similarly, in Authorson v. Canada, the Supreme
Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter Welfare Cases” in Margot Young, Susan Boyd & Sheilagh
Day, eds., Poverty Rights, Social Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2007), at 24.
104
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Court stated: “long-standing parliamentary tradition makes it clear that
the only procedure due any citizen of Canada is that proposed legislation receive three readings in the Senate and House of Commons and
that it receive Royal Assent. Once that process is completed, legislation
within Parliament’s competence is unassailable.”107 On that basis, the
Court upheld legislation to expropriate interest owed on pensions of disabled veterans, even contrary to the Crown’s fiduciary duty, and rejected
Authorson’s claim that he should have been given notice and a hearing to
contest the expropriation law.
One response to the doctrinal objection is that neither Wells nor
Authorson concerned a constitutional rights claim. Wells was principally
argued on administrative law grounds,108 and the claim in Authorson was
based on the Bill of Rights protections against deprivation of property
except by due process of law and to a fair hearing for determination of
rights and obligations.109 And indeed, the Court in Authorson conceded
that “legislatures are subject to constitutional requirements for valid lawmaking, but within their constitutional boundaries, they can do as they
see fit”.110
It remains an open question, from a doctrinal perspective, whether
courts might directly or indirectly favour more inclusive lawmaking
practices or take into account political marginalization in enforcing
constitutional rights. Although the Court has not read rights to participation
beyond ordinary electoral processes into existing constitutional guarantees, it
has suggested a willingness to encourage more inclusive policymaking
through rights enforcement, even at the risk of blurring traditional lines
around its function. In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, for example, the
Court, by a 5-4 majority, approved of a novel constitutional remedy in which
the judge retained jurisdiction to require the Nova Scotia government to
report to the claimants, in Court, its progress in constructing schools in
fulfilment of constitutional minority language education rights.111 A strong
dissent objected that the court was overstepping its role of declaring the law
and ordering relief and thus undermined the principle of separation of
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powers.112 The case does stand, however, as an example of the softening of
rigid conceptions of the separation of powers in service of the Court’s
perception of effective rights enforcement.
A focus on whether it is doctrinally feasible to factor political marginalization into the proportionality calculus begs the question of
whether such a thing is normatively desirable. This paper does not purport to offer an exhaustive answer to that question. Rather, it suggests
that if the normative concern underlying proportionality analysis is with
oppressive majoritarianism, then, in a complex world where it becomes
difficult to demonstrate with certainty that a policy is doing what it purports to do, it may make sense to offer governments a greater margin of
manoeuvre where they are making efforts toward more inclusiveness in
setting law and policy.
It notes briefly, however, that accounting for political marginalization
in this way finds support within frameworks that see rights as corrections
for democratic deficits in ordinary political processes. Traditionally,
human and constitutional rights have been criticized for being antidemocratic: they vest power in courts to second-guess democratic
legislative choices. Two responses are typical: some concede the point
that rights are anti-majoritarian, but accept that other values are more
important.113 Deliberative democratic theorists, seeking to steer a middle
ground between rights and democracy, and drawing on the idea that
democracy and rights are interdependent,114 support the increasingly
dominant idea that courts and legislatures both have a role to play in
rights enforcement. Further, they have challenged the democratic
legitimacy of ordinary political processes themselves, urging more robust
processes seeking better input from citizenry.115 Giving government more
leeway when it seeks to craft laws with input from and attention to
groups traditionally marginalized from political processes is one way to
encourage such collaboration.
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Taking account of the political exclusion of marginalized groups and
individuals in allocating the risk of uncertainty in proportionality analysis
likewise finds support among those who argue that section 7 ought to be
informed by a concern for substantive equality and addressing social and
economic power imbalance.116 Indeed, this paper has suggested that
proportionality analysis, detached from such a substantive purpose, runs
the risk of arbitrariness. Section 1 is concerned with when governments,
through the laws they pass, might justifiably place limits on rights.
Section 7, on the other hand, has the potential to support a substantive
conception of proportionality that responds to heavy-handed, opaque,
perverse or ineffective policy that compromises life, liberty and security
of the person. Given the complexities of measuring the real-world impact
of law and policy, such a normative foundation may help temper, cabin, or
at least expose some of the subjectivity inherent in a purportedly valueneutral proportionality analysis.
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